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I. Abstract
The gap between the revenue generated by Division One football players and
the value of an athletic scholarship is the marginal revenue product of these athletes.
Because of the monopsonistic behavior of the NCAA, Division One institutions
capture an economic rent from their student athletes. This paper measures the rents
generated by NCAA Division One football players in the six powerhouse conferences
by using linear regressions based on variables such as university revenue, future NFL
draft picks, undergraduate population, and weekly AP Top-25 rankings. This paper
will inform its readers on how much money these student athletes are generating for
the NCAA and their respective schools, and will provide understanding as to why
there has been so much controversy regarding the payment to NCAA athletes.
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III. Introduction
Collegiate athletics is more prominent in the United States than in any other
country. There are approximately 1200 member schools comprising the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (the “NCAA”), which is structured into three
Divisions (I,II, and III). At its highest and most competitive levels, the NCAA is
responsible for creating the excitement of the BCS Championship Game, the roller
coaster ride known as March Madness, the aura surrounding the Heisman trophy, and
the College World Series. The constant televised imagery of NCAA games,
highlights, and players helps fuel the passion that lead boosters and alumni to
extreme, and often inappropriate and illegal behavior.1 With the advent of billiondollar television rights contracts, there is little debate that big time NCAA Division
One collegiate athletics is big business.
There has been much controversy in recent years relating to payments, gifts,
and so-called loans to student athletes and the NCAA rules prohibiting such largess.
Is it the inherent nature of collegiate athletes to resist, bend or break the rules, or are
the NCAA’s rules governing the conduct of today’s student athlete, in today’s
marketplace, outdated and in dire need of change? One could argue that youth will

1

“Alabama Fan Arrested for Killing Auburn Oak Trees.” Dashiell, Bennet. Business
Insider, Feb. 17, 2011. http://www.businessinsider.com/alabama-auburn-tree-deaths2011-2
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always be pre-disposed to making poor decisions, but the problem is not new and is
exacerbated by the economics of big time collegiate athletics.
One of the most prevalent controversies in Division One athletics is illegal
payments to athletes. It is not rare to learn about a current or former Division One
football or basketball player or program being suspended or otherwise penalized by
the NCAA for accepting payments from a booster or an agent, or otherwise engaging
in “illegal behavior”2. Recent college stars such as Reggie Bush, Dez Bryant, and AJ
Green were all found to have accepted funds that were not NCAA sanctioned.3 Such
allegations cast a pall not only over the offending athlete (Reggie Bush had to return
his Heisman Trophy) but over entire Universities (USC had to forfeit its past
championship seasons, for example). Programs are crippled and as a result innocent
student athletes can be left without the coaches that recruited them or the type of
program they came to play for. It is not only the most famous college athletes who
violate the rules, however. In an interview written by George Dohrmann for Sports
Illustrated in 2010, former agent Josh Luchs conceded that he had paid over thirty
college players to curry favor if and when they turned professional.4
One of the main goals of the NCAA is to maintain the association’s amateur
status by prohibiting the payment or the giving of things of value to its athletes.

2

“College Football and Crime.” Benedict, Jeff & Keteyian, Armen. Sports
Illustrated. Mar. 2, 2011.
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/the_bonus/02/27/cfb.crime/index.html
3
“A.J. Green Case at Georgia Illustrates Hypocrisy of College Jersey Sales.” Travis,
Clay. AOL. Sept. 8, 2010. http://www.aolnews.com/2010/09/08/a-j-green-case-atgeorgia-illustrates-hypocrisy-of-college-jers/
4
“Confessions of an Agent.” Dohrmann, George. Sports Illustrated. Oct. 18, 2010.
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/magazine/10/12/agent/index.html
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According to NCAA rules, Section 2, Title V; “It is a violation of the NCAA rules for
athletes to accept money or gifts while intending to remain eligible.” In light of the
fact that many outstanding NCAA athletes come from underprivileged homes, do not
have the financial ability to make ends meet once on campus, even with a full athletic
scholarship, and cannot work because of the demands of their sport, one can begin to
understand the temptations faced by an easily influenced young athlete. These facts,
in conjunction with the gaudy revenue generated by the NCAA, which is then shared
with the college or university as an additional revenue stream, begin to explain why
paying certain student athletes may be justified.
Everyone involved in the execution of a Division One basketball or football
game-from the University athletic department to ticket vendors, hot dog vendors, TV
contractors, coaches, referees, and field crew- are all paid. One then wonders why the
people actually providing the services upon which all the revenue is generated are the
only ones not compensated. The degree to which these athletes are exploited is quite
concerning. Because NCAA athletes are not deemed workers, they are not free to
form a workers’ union. Like all athletes, they are subject to lose their “job” at a
moment’s notice due to injury or the whim of a coach.
Some former NCAA athletes and state legislators are suggesting legislation
that would allow paying student athletes a stipend beyond the value of their
scholarship5. An athletic scholarship in Division One covers tuition, room and board,
and in certain cases books for classes. However, most of the student’s living expenses

5

“Scholarship Shortfall Study Reveals College Athletes Paid To Play.” NCPA News
Release. March 26, 2009. http://www.ncpanow.org/releases_advisories?id=0009
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are not covered by this scholarship. A report conducted by Ithaca College researchers
found that a student-athlete’s scholarship is $3000 short of what former NCAA
President Myles Brand called “cost of attendance.”6 Thus, not only are the generators
of a billion dollar business deprived from participating in the revenue they help
generate, they are not allowed to recover for daily living and necessary academic
expenses for things like groceries, a haircut, a calculator, or a computer.
As there are supporters for “Pay for Play” there are those against it, claiming a
free education and the help of the admissions office in gaining admission to the
university are compensation enough. However, as stated earlier, the cost of
attendance can typically exceed the value of the scholarship, and thus, financially
underprivileged students are still faced with economic difficulties. Furthermore, the
full value of the scholarship they do receive is often undermined by the system itself,
which prohibits many student athletes from attending all classes and fully
participating in the academic aspect of college life. Indeed the value of the
scholarship can be minimal if the student doesn’t attend class or graduate. It is an
accomplishment today for a Division One football powerhouse to graduate half of its
players.7 In essence, a large, revenue-generating program could place virtually no
importance on graduating its players, yet continually win championships for its
school, earning many millions of dollars for the institution the NCAA. Thus, this
hypocritical aspect of the NCAA is quite striking. As the NCAA claims one of its
6

“NCAA Might Face Damages in Hundreds of Millions.” Farrey, Tom. ESPN The
Magazine. Feb. 21, 2006. http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2337810
7
“NCAA Football Grad Rates at All Time High, but Top Schools Falter.” Wieberg,
Steve. USA Today. Oct. 27, 2010. http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2010-1027-ncaa-graduation-rates-study_N.htm
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chief goals is “maintaining amateurism”, the NCAA seems more like a self-righteous,
self-serving big business than an entity which truly has the best interests of its
“workers”, the student athlete, at heart.
If legislation is signed and Division One football players are financially
compensated beyond their scholarship, how much money would these players
receive? Following the model of Robert W. Brown’s empirical study, my goal in
writing this paper is to estimate the revenue generated by a premium power
conference (ACC, Big East, Big 10, Big 12, Pac-10, SEC) Division One football
player. Because Brown’s original data was collected prior to 1993, I updated the data
set to account for years 2006 through 2009. With a more recent study dedicated to the
payment and value of a premium college football player, I hope to provide some
insight and new information on the monetary value generated by some of our
country’s most recognized and talented student athletes and how that value can affect
the current debate over whether or not they should be paid.
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IV. Literature Review
There are many articles, inquiries, and studies which advocate the payment of
NCAA athletes. The study on which I modeled my paper, “An Estimate of the Rent
Generated by a Premium College Football Player” by Robert W. Brown, measures the
economic rents universities capture from its football players. Brown uses variables
such as universities’ revenue, recruiting pools, national prestige, and NFL draft status
to determine how much revenue these players generate for their respective schools.
Brown’s “Estimate” was published in 1993 and thus may be outdated. His study
found, at that time, a premium college football player generated over $500,000 for his
respective team. My objective in conducting my own updated research and analysis is
to find the current value of the revenue generated by premium college football
players.
John Rooney, author of The Recruiting Game suggests a change to the NCAA
system. In his book, Rooney proposes a reform to the traditional inter-collegiate
sports infrastructure. The revenue sports in intercollegiate athletics would become
semi-professional franchises located within university communities. Rooney’s main
goal is to eliminate the many problems, scandals, and investigations that coincide
with major revenue generating programs within the confines of American
universities. His expertise in geography allows him to illustrate many recruiting
patterns. In my study I will be modifying one of his indices- the pool variable. As
11

defined by Robert W. Brown in his study, the pool variable measures the number of
recruits at each major school relative to the number of recruits produced in each
respective state. By following some of Rooney’s basic principles and practices, I was
able to construct my own indices of recruitment and recruit population.
The article “Pay for Play for College Athletes: Now, More Than Ever” by
Peter Goplerud discusses the possibility of paying a stipend to NCAA Division One
athletes. The article discusses how these revenue-producing collegiate athletes are
exploited on a regular basis and proposes a stipend system. Goplerud is in favor of a
stipend, as he notes that a free education, expansion of social networks, and
memorable life experiences alone are not sufficient payment. Goplerud discusses past
trials regarding the NCAA and anti-trust issues. The paper also covers different legal
issues and questions which may arise with the implementation of a stipend system for
specified institutions. Gender equity, labor laws, and taxation issues are among these
issues. The NCAA and its institutions do not recognize its athletes as employees for
workers’ compensation purposes for fear that doing so will reshape the mission of
higher education institutions. Granting workers’ compensation could also lead to
athlete demands for salaries, collective bargaining, and benefits, including, disability
payments for injuries sustained during participation of team activities.
In a related article, “Forward Progress? An Analysis of Whether StudentAthletes Should Be Paid”, Christopher Parent (2003) reviews current legislation in
place for the implementation of a stipend for revenue-producing athletes. The
argument against “Pay for Play” is addressed in the article. The NCAA’s primary
argument against “Pay for Play” is to preserve the athletes’ amateur status. The
12

NCAA defends its athletes’ amateur status as the reason why there should be no
payments beyond an athletic scholarship. Parent’s article explains that the
exploitation of collegiate athletes demonstrates the hypocritical nature of the NCAA.
As explained in many “Pay for Play” articles, the NCAA permits teams to
generate millions of dollars of revenue for its respective institutions but does not
require that the players graduate. Furthermore, the true value of an athletic
scholarship cannot and is not being realized because of the low rate of graduation of
collegiate football and basketball players. This problem is exacerbated with longer
regular season and playoff schedules forcing students to miss more classes. Due to
this perceived hypocrisy and exploitation of the student athlete, there are current
legislative initiatives in place to better voice these concerns. As stated by Parent,
separate initiatives signed by Senator Ernie Chambers of Nebraska and Senator Kevin
Murray of California are pushing for a “Pay for Play” proposal.
Workers compensation is a major issue in the argument concerning “Pay for
Play.” However, as explained in Beckham and Mondello’s “Workers’ Compensation
and Collegiate Athletes: The Debate Over the Pay for Play Model: A Counterpoint,”
there are some hurdles that lie in the way of payment of collegiate athletes. Advocates
of “Pay for Play” have been largely unsuccessful in persuading state legislatures to
reform workers’ compensation laws to include student athletes. In addition, the
judicial system has accepted the position that collegiate athletes are not employees.
The largest obstacle in “Pay for Play” involves anti-trust regulations. The NCAA is
governed on an amateur status and is thus exempt from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
If collegiate athletes were granted employee status, it is possible that doing so could
13

bring about anti-trust claims against the NCAA, unions, wage negotiations, and other
benefits.8 Institutions would also be put in a hard position if they were to pay athletes
of revenue-generating sports and not other athletes who dedicate equivalent time and
energy to their respective sports.
Lawrence W. Kahn examines collegiate sports in the context of the theory of
cartels. Many point to the attempts by the NCAA to restrict output and payments for
factors of production as evidence of cartel behavior. Others argue that such limits
enhance product quality by preserving amateurism. The author finds that the NCAA’s
compensation limits on athletes lead to high levels of rents from the entertainment
revenues produced by the athletes. The athletes producing these rents are mostly
African- American, while the beneficiaries are primarily white. The rents are
typically spent on coaches’ salaries, facilities, and non-revenue sports.

8

“Forget Utah; Alabama Could be Key To Successful BCS Anti-Trust Suit.” Staples,
Andy. Sports Illustrated. Nov. 5, 2010.
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/andy_staples/11/05/bcsantitrust/index.html
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V. Data
As a measure to define how much money each school generates via their
football programs, the first variable defined is the 2009 Football Revenue generated
by each respective football program in the Atlantic Coast Conference, Big East, Big
Ten, Big Twelve, Pac-10, and Southeastern Conference. The revenue of each
program was found through the U.S. Department of Education’s website for fiscal
year 2009. In Division One athletics, a team’s success is equated not merely by the
wins and losses columns, but by the school’s market exposure, TV contracts, Bowl
Game appearances, ticket sales, donations, and apparel sales. College football has
long been the most profitable sport among collegiate athletics. The vast amount of
revenue generated by football and basketball programs is extremely important
because without such revenue many non-revenue generating sports at colleges and
universities would not be able to stay afloat. The most important factor in generating
this revenue for the universities, as well as for the NCAA, is the athletes themselves.
Without these athletes attracting millions of spectators and sponsors, most athletic
programs would not only struggle to generate a profit, but certain sports would have
to be cut from athletic departments. After looking at how much revenue is generated
by these football programs through the efforts of the athletes, one can see why the
claim of student-athlete exploitation is at the forefront of the “Pay for Play” debate.
Typically, a larger undergraduate population of a university results in a
bigger, more successful athletic program. Furthermore, large universities often have a
strong “school spirit” as well as enthusiastic, generous alumni who feel it is their duty
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to give back to their alma mater. Because it is impossible to ascertain the exact
number of fans each university has for its athletic teams, the variable Undergraduate
Population serves as a substitute. This variable, like 2009 Football Revenue, was
found on the U.S. Department of Education’s website for academic year 2009.
Though most schools in the major conferences have large undergraduate populations,
this figure does vary.
One may define a “premium college football player” in a plethora of ways.
Because there are so many collegiate football players in the top conferences, let alone
all of Division One, the most suitable way to define a premium player is whether the
player has been selected in the NFL draft. The 2006-2009 Draft Picks variable
consists of the total number of players drafted from each respective school from 2006
to 2009. This data was found by looking on the NFL’s website of past drafts and
analyzing the total amount of players selected by NFL teams for the years 2006 to
2009. In short, the more players selected in the NFL Draft, the more talented the team
is considered. In college athletics, team skill is correlated with team success, and the
more successful and/or exciting a team is to watch, the more revenue the team will
generate through increased broadcasts, ticket sales, apparel sales, and other revenue
sources.
Throughout the course of the season, the Associated Press releases a weekly
Top 25 Ranking, beginning the week before the first game of the season and
continuing until a week after the BCS National Championship Game when a final
Top 25 Ranking is released. To find a team’s average ranking, I collected each
school’s ranking for every week from the beginning of the 2006 season to the end of
16

the 2008 season. This variable is titled 2006-2008 Average Rank. Not only does a
high ranking detect a more successful team, but the best high school players may be
more likely to select a school which has been consistently highly-ranked or has won a
national championship in the recent past. Teams who were not ranked in the Top 25
were assigned a ranking of 26. For the variable 2009 Average Opponent Rank, every
school’s 2009 schedule was collected. By looking at each team’s opponent’s average
ranking for the 2009 season, the Average Opponent Ranking was found. A team with
a relatively low numeric Average Opponent Ranking means they are playing, on
average, more talented or successful opponents. A potential recruit can view this as a
way to play against the best players in the country while being exposed on a national
scale. Teams with a harder strength of schedule (a metric used in college football and
basketball) are usually given the benefit of the doubt when selected for a post-season
invitational or tournament.
In Robert Brown’s “An Estimate of the Revenue Generated by a Premium
College Football Player,” Brown uses a variable employed in John Rooney’s, The
Recruiting Game. This variable is defined as the Pool variable. Based on the data
which was available, I modified the name and definition of this variable, which I call
the Exposure Ratio. Certain schools and universities enjoy an inherent advantage in
the size and quality of the recruitment pool it can select from. For instance, colleges
in Texas, where high school football is practically considered a religion, have
available greater numbers of highly skilled local high school players compared to
other regions of the country. Conversely, fewer high school athletes play football in
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the northeast due to weather conditions and urban surroundings, typically resulting in
less successful football programs in that area.
Although the Exposure Ratio is very generalized, it serves as a way to
measure the differences in recruitment among schools and also shares insight into
how much more effort some universities must exert to land highly touted high school
players. A low Exposure Ratio for a school infers that a school is not located in a
high-school football crazed surrounding and a program would thus need to exert more
effort (money, time, the passing up on comparable recruits) to sign a talented recruit.
Conversely, a school with a higher Ratio means there is more talent near the
university and it thus would be easier for that school to sign local athletes.
Universities located in talent rich high school areas are more easily exposed to local
stars, and thus may exert more effort on other aspects of the football program outside
of recruitment. I determined this ratio by first ascertaining all the high school recruits
for years 2007 and 2008 from each state that has at least one power-conference school
in it. I then divided the total number of high school recruits from each state for 2007
and 2008 by the number of power-conference schools in each state. I took that
quotient and divided it by the number of recruits brought in to each school for 20072008. For example, the state of Arkansas had 39 high school football players in 2007
and 2008 that went on to play at a power-conference school. Because there is only
one power-conference school in Arkansas (University of Arkansas) I took the total
number of recruits from the state of Arkansas (39) and divided it by the number of
recruits the University of Arkansas brought in for those two years (53). In this case,
the Exposure Ratio is .73.
18

VI. Results and Analysis
Once I finalized my data collection for each of the variables, I ran linear
regressions to find an approximation of the value generated by premium college
football players. In staying consistent in my research and analysis, I followed Robert
W. Brown’s formation and implementation of his regressions to use for mine. The
variable 2009 Football Revenue was used as the independent variable. Variables
Undergraduate Population, 2006-2009 Draft Picks, 2006-2008 Average Ranking,
Exposure Ratio, and 2009 Average Opponent Rank were all used as the dependent
variables. The independent variable was then run against all of the dependent
variables. I ran three regressions, as Brown did, in order to ascertain the most
accurate value possible. The output of these regressions proved to be significant as
the Significance-F read less than .05 in all three cases. These regressions are included,
and all can be seen on the following page.
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Independent Variable is 2009 Football Revenue
CONSTANT

UNDERGRADUATE
POPULATION
(2009)
AVG.OPPONENT
RANK (2009)
2006-2009 DRAFT
PICKS
2006-2008 AVG.
RANK

First Regression
75247968.8

Second Regression
108244961.3

Third Regression
108818127.4

592.077

604.891

-3000251.546

-3002038.56

-2972413.297

1038657.378

409652.603

457243.604

-1124192.508

-1141742.255

675.197

-1639075.07

EXPOSURE RATIO

n= 65

R 2 = .321

R 2 = .388

R 2 = .391

Using 2009 Football Revenue as the independent variable and the variables
Undergraduate Population, Average Opponent Rank 2009, and Draft Picks as the
dependent variables, the first linear regression showed a significant model (p<.05).
Undergraduate Population and Draft Picks were significant while Average Opponent
Rank was not. The R-Square value is .321, which means that my data can predict 32.1
percent of any sort of trend occurring. Using these variables, the Coefficient of
“2006-2009 Draft Picks” resulted in a finding that premium college football players
each generate roughly $1,038,657.38 each year. Though I followed Brown’s model,
there are many reasons why the outputs from my regressions vary from his original
20

findings. The main reason for this is because I modified all of the variables at least
slightly. Certain adjustments had to be made because of the fact that I am using
different, more recent data to ensure that my results are reflective of the present time,
and are not outdated. Furthermore, I was not able to contact each school directly to
collect individual statistics regarding revenue sources. It was my intention throughout
the completion of this project to conduct this study in a manner similar to Brown’s
paper while implementing my own adaptations.
The second regression appears to the right of the first regression. In the second
regression, 2009 Football Revenues is again the independent variable, while
Undergraduate Population, Average Opponent Rank 2009, 2006-2009 Draft Picks,
and Average Rank 2006-2008 were all used as the dependent variables. The RSquare is .387, and Significance F is significant (p<.05). Variables Undergraduate
Population and Average Rank 2006-2008 showed significance while Draft Picks and
Opponent Rank did not. Based on Brown’s model, in this regression the revenue
generated by premium players is $409,652.60 per year. This value is much less than
that of the first regression, but as mentioned previously, that is due to the differences
in data and modifications of certain variables.
In the third and final regression, all variables except 2009 Football Revenue
were included as dependent variables. Undergraduate Population and Rank 20062008 were the only variables that were significant. The estimated annual value of a
premium football player is $457,243.60 in this regression. Interestingly enough, this
value is only $50,000 less than that of Brown’s value despite the 20+ year difference
in data. Though I was expecting a value much greater than Brown’s, because I
21

adhered to his model and his variables may explain why my value in the third
regression is so similar to his original findings. Considering that I did modify my
variables and some of the data that Robert Brown used was unavailable during my
research process, this suggests that this may be a fair value to assign the best
collegiate football players in the top-tier conferences.
Because of the large discrepancy between the first value of $1,038,657.38 and
the lesser values of $409,652.60 and $457,243.60, I ran additional regressions to find
the variable(s) which account for the drop in values. The variable 2009 Football
Revenue remained as the independent variable in each of these regressions. However,
I ran these regressions all with different combinations of the dependent variables in
order to determine which variable or variables accounted for this difference in values.
After running these regressions, I determined that it was variable Undergraduate
Population which accounted for this disparity. After running the regressions which
excluded this variable, all of the values for the estimated generated revenue were in
the range of $501,172.89 to $552,247. I then proceeded to run regressions with the
variable Undergraduate Population. All of these values were in excess of $1,000,000.
It is clear that this variable is responsible for this great difference in values. By
including this variable, the estimated revenue generated by premium football players
is over $500,000 than the outputs of the other regressions. By excluding the variable
Undergraduate Population, the outputs were only approximately $50,000 more.
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VII. Conclusion
The outputs I found for possible values of premium collegiate football players
ranged from $409,652.60 to $1,038,657.38. The largest value I found ($1,038,657.38)
reflects greatly increased revenues generated by big time college football programs.
Although much greater than the value found by Brown in his work, it is not a surprise
because of the many years between our respective research. The two smaller values
obtained in my second and third regressions were much closer together and much
closer to the value found by Brown in 1993. These findings suggest that the value
generated by the NCAA Division One football athletes for their schools, although not
as great as my first value, has nevertheless been significant and constant for many
years. There was a noticeable discrepancy between the first regression and the last
two regressions. By running additional regressions, I determined that the variable
Undergraduate Population was responsible for this.
The debate over “Pay for Play” continues to be necessary. It is the
responsibility of the NCAA to keep pace with athletes and the sports industry. It is a
common occurrence to read about the payment of illegal, under the table money to
elite college athletes. Are the athletes themselves responsible for their actions? Yes.
But I believe a system that ignores the monetary value of an athlete’s efforts is
severely flawed.
This study was motivated by my interest and passion for college athletics.
From the outside looking in, the NCAA and its labyrinth of rules and regulations
often make no sense to the athletes, coaches and schools it governs. Like any
successful income producing endeavor in our country, athletes who serve as
23

generators of such a large revenue pool should be entitled to participate, in at least
some way, in the fruits of their labor. The payment of a stipend to these athletes not
only would cover the cost of necessary items not covered by a scholarship, but at the
very least would take away the excuse that under the table money is needed to make
ends meet. I believe some sort of compensation is definitely in order.
One of the primary goals of this paper was to find an estimated monetary
value of the amount of revenue some of the best collegiate athletes generate for their
schools and the NCAA. All top-tier football programs have many people who
contribute to their successes. While many non-athletes contribute to the success of a
big time college athletic program, none contribute more so than the players
responsible for the competition itself. The insight gained from researching and
analyzing recent data concerning college football shows the significant sums these
athletes generate for their schools. It is up to the NCAA and the supporters of “Pay
for Play” to continue this important debate until the time when the value generated by
these athletes approximates the value of what they receive in return. Only then can it
be said that such big time athletics are not exploitive of the athlete.
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VII. Accumulated Data

School

Total Revenues
2009

Undergraduate Pop.
(2009)

‘06-'09 Draft
Picks

2006-2008 AVG
Rank

EXPOSUR
E RATIO

2009 AVG
OPP Rank

Boston College

$19,184,902

9,501

10

20.39

0.383

24.54

Clemson

$30,994,503

14,326

14

21.70

0.777

24.09

Duke

$16,109,324

6,400

0

26

0.601

22.69

Florida St.

$18,958,861

27,513

17

23.70

2.01

22.69

Georgia Tech

$24,870,064

12,351

12

23.60

2.48

23.53

$11,540,368

24,520

12

23.85

1.3

24.20

Maryland
Miami
(FL)

$24,631,029

9,268

18

25.33

1.93

19.66

UNC

$22,077,550

17,267

8

25.58

0.58

22.92

NC State

$22,018,738

21,840

13

26

0.505

23.88

Virginia

$19,004,653

13,849

15

26

1.15

22.78

$31,155,870

23,052

21

17.79

0.866

21.82

Wake Forest

V.T.

$10,227,922

4,511

10

23.79

0.641

23.823

Cincinnati

$13,325,304

18,128

10

23.89

1.565

24.05

Connecticut

$14,400,371

16,240

7

25.95

0.302

23.77

Louisville

$15,537,276

11,855

15

18.72

0.392

23.88

Pittsburgh

$22,513,336

16,690

12

25.20

1.25

24.22

Rutgers
South
Florida

$19,494,261

27,537

10

22.16

2.14

23.71

$16,562,391

22,563

4

21.93

2.01

23.02

Syracuse
West
Virginia

$19,152,691

12,731

8

26

0.547

22.48

$29,467,612

20,260

7

11.97

0.14

23.92

Illinois

$25,301,783

30,319

5

25.62

0.86

22.01

Indiana

$21,783,185

30,983

4

26

0.438

22.28

Iowa

$45,854,764

18,319

12

24.43

0.207

23.16

Michigan
Michigan

$63,189,417

25,261

18

17.87

0.795

22.32

$44,462,659

33,238

10

24.87

0.833

23.60

Minnesota

$32,322,688

27,636

6

25.66

0.5

24.06

Northwestern

$22,704,959

8,499

3

25.83

1.102

23.65

Ohio State

$63,750,000

37,629

27

5.37

2.11

22.44

Penn State

$70,208,584

37,077

18

18.68

1.52

23.65

Purdue

$18,118,898

30,306

12

26

0.407

23.52

Wisconsin

$38,662,971

27,145

14

18.64

0.47

23.65

Baylor

$14,355,322

11,880

4

26

2.11

24.44

Colorado

$26,233,929

24,774

9

26

0.583

22.54

Iowa State

$19,974,924

21,081

4

26

0.183

23.60

Kansas

$17,885,176

18,809

4

20.56

0.489

23.12

St

25

Kansas State

$17,570,624

16,413

7

25.93

0.351

23.61

Missouri

$25,378,066

22,325

11

16.70

0.96

22.62

Nebraska

$49,928,228

17,737

14

23.95

0.283

24.05

Oklahoma
Oklahoma
St

$58,295,888

17,131

18

7.79

0.524

21.79

$32,787,498

15,266

4

22.75

0.43

23.22

Texas

$93,942,815

35,107

22

8.60

2.2

24.32

Texas A&M

$41,915,428

35,344

9

25.39

2.25

22.56

Texas Tech

$26,201,009

22,048

8

19.75

2.25

21.22

Arizona

$24,398,253

26,989

11

26

0.6

22.10

Arizona State

$29,587,236

45,490

11

21.62

0.48

22.81

California

$24,421,437

24,796

16

19.08

1.717

21.35

Oregon

$29,505,906

16,942

16

18.62

0.2

23.06

Oregon St.

$19,056,237

15,041

13

25.83

0.2

21.81

Stanford

$21,309,949

6,564

7

25.16

2.194

25.27

UCLA

$22,298,856

25,772

7

26

2.394

22.88

USC

$29,080,117

15,984

37

5.16

2.135

22.82

Washington

$33,919,639

28,052

3

26

0.44

21.67

Washington St.

$12,754,541

18,620

5

19.06

0.451

22.98

Alabama

$71,884,525

21,552

12

26

0.88

22.86

Arkansas

$48,524,244

13,534

12

23.50

0.734

19.84

Auburn

$66,162,720

18,385

17

18.31

0.8

21.91

Florida

$39,053,219

31,133

17

6.64

2.01

24.35

Georgia

$70,838,539

24,551

22

13.87

2.07

20.63

Kentucky

$31,161,247

17,549

5

26

0.302

21.70

$68,819,806

21,376

12

8.02

1.35

21.22

Mississippi

$28,409,774

11,972

7

26

0.594

22.61

Mississippi St

$14,551,275

13,206

2

26

0.516

19.08

LSU

South
Carolina

$58,266,159

18,881

0

23.81

0.598

21.14

Tennessee

$56,593,946

19,686

15

20.62

0.69

21.15

Vanderbilt

$22,506,492

6,729

5

25.39

0.989

20.83

26
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